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Recent Developments

State v. Fisher
County Administrative Judge Is Not Required to Make Findings or Articulate
Reasons Demonstrating that Postponement Was Warranted
By Jerry W. Hyatt

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that
Maryland Rule 4-271 and Art. 27, §
591 do not require an administrative
judge to articulate a good cause
reason for postponing a trial date
beyond the 180-day limitations
period. State v. Fisher, 353 Md.
297, 726 A.2d 231 (1999). The
court further held that the defendant
has the burden of demonstrating the
existence of a speedy trial violation
based on either a clear abuse of
discretion standard or a lack of good
cause as a matter of law. In so
holding, the court afforded state
administrative judges wide discretion
when postponing a trial date past the
180-day limit.
James Quinn Fisher ("Fisher")
was charged with various drug
offenses, including possession ofcrack
cocaine with the intent to distribute.
Id at 299, 726 A.2d at 232. On July
10, 1997, Fisher's attorney entered
his appearance, triggering the 180-day
period in which the case would have
to be tried under Rule 4-271 and Art.
27, § 591. Id. The case was
scheduled for a bench trial on
December 2, 1997,butbecausethe
defendant requested a jury trial on or
about that day, the case was
postponed 42 days beyond the 180
day limit. Id. at 300, 726 A.2d at
232.
On February 17,1998, when

the matter was again called for trial,
the defendant moved to dismiss the
case based on a speedy trial violation
under § 591 and Rule 4-271. Id· The
trial judge denied the motion, stating
that the administrative judge had the
authority to postpone the case and
had done so upon good cause. Id at
301,726A.2dat233. Subsequently,
the defendant pled not guilty, and was
tried on an agreed statement of facts.
Id. Fisher was convicted on all
charges in the Circuit Court for
Washington County and was
sentenced to nine years in prison. Id
The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland reversed, holding that
Rule 4-271 and § 591 were violated
because Fisher was not tried within
the prescribed time limit and the
administrative judge neglected to
articulate a good cause finding. Id.
The court of appeals granted the
State's petition for certiorari and
reversed. Id at 303, 726 A.2d at
234.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland relied on prior case law to
support its conclusion that the court
of special appeals's holding was
inconsistent with previous Maryland
decisions regarding the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. Id The court
first visited Goins v. State, 293 Md.
97,442 A.2d 550 (1982), where the
defendant was not tried within the
180-day limit due to the extensive

examination period resulting from a
"not criminally responsible" plea. Id
at 303, 726 A.2d at 234. In Goins,
the court of appeals held that Rule
4-271 and § 591 were satisfied
anytime an order by the administrative
judge effectively postponed a trial, so
long as it was done in good cause.
Id at 305, 726 A.2d at 235 (citing
Goins, 293 Md. at 111-112, 442
A.2d at 557-558).
The court also analyzed State
v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422,470 A.2d
1269 (1984), in which the court of
appeals re-affirmed Goins by
holding that an administrative judge's
decision to postpone a trial is a
"discretionary matter, rarely subject
to reversal upon review." Id. at 306,
726 A.2d at 235 (citing Frazier, 298
Md. at 451,470 A.2d at 1284). In
Frazier, the court discussed the
standard for finding an absence of
good cause for a postponement
beyond the 180 day limit. Id. (citing
Frazier, 298 Md. at 454,470 A.2d
at 1286). The court held that a judge
should not find an absence of good
cause unless "the defendant meets
the burden of demonstrating either a
clear abuse of discretion or a lack of
good cause as a matter oflaw." Id.
Based on the rationale given in
Goins and Frazier, the court in the
instant case held that the burden is
not on the administrative judge to
explain the reasons amounting to
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good cause, but instead on the
defendant to demonstrate either a lack
of good cause as a matter oflaw, or a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. Id. at 307, 726 A.2d at 236.
Here, the court held that Fisher failed
to meet this burden Id. at 308, 726
A.2d at 236.
Fisher also argued that the length
of delay from the original 180-day
mark to the actual trial date was an
"inordinate" delay, and therefore
violated Article 27, § 591 and Rule
4-271. Id. at 309, 726 A.2d at 237.
The court of appeals again looked to
Frazier for guidance in determining
which delays are considered
"inordinate." In Frazier, the court
held that a delay of 86 days beyond
the 180-day mark was not a violation
of§591 or Rule 4-271 because there
was no clear abuse of discretion
shown on the part ofthe administrative
judge. Id. at 310, 726 A.2d at 237
(citing Frazier, 298 Md. at 462, 470
A.2d at 1290). The Frazier court
explained its refusal to find a clear
abuse of discretion by stating that an
administrative judge is in a much better
position than either a trial or appellate
judge to determine whether there is
good cause to re-schedule a trial,
because he or she is more aware of
the number of cases on the criminal
docket. Id. at 309-10, 726 A.2d at
237. Thus, the Fisher court
concluded that because extending the
180-day limit by 86 days did not
constitute an "inordinate" delay, a
delay of 42 days would not violate
Rule 4-271 or § 591 either. Id. at
311, 726 A.2d at 238. As such, the
administrative judge neither failed to
show good cause, nor abused his or

her discretion in postponing Fisher's

trial.
With its holding, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland placed the
burden of proving a speedy trial
violation on the defendant. Once
thought of as a Constitutional
protection for the defendant, the court
of appeals narrowed the defendant's
right to speedy justice by significantly
broadening an administrative judge's
discretion. While trial delay is often
beneficial to the defense, this decision
reduces the likelihood that Maryland
defendants will ever incorporate the
speedy trial rule into their trial strategy.
Moreover, the court of appeals's
interpretation ofthe speedy trial rule
gives Maryland prosecutors more
confidence when requesting a strategic
postponement, even if that date falls
beyond the 180-day limit.
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